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ongress has scattered among various statutes at least thirty 
exemptions or modifications of antitrust law.1  The greatest 
concentration of these exemptions is in the area of commercial 
transportation where there are six such exemptions, the oldest relating 
to ocean shipping.2  Indeed, until the deregulatory movement of the 
1970s and 1980s, most rates, routes, and terms for transportation were 
the subject of direct regulatory control.  However, starting in the 
1970s, legislative policy toward transportation dramatically changed.3  
Increasingly, federal policy favors market competition in 
transportation sectors and discourages regulatory interference.  Yet 
the exemptions remain on the books, and companies regularly seek 
their benefit.  This leads to an empirical question, which will form the 
core of this Article: what kinds of conduct are now being presented to 
regulators for approval and antitrust immunity? 
The empirical evidence presented in this Article shows that the 
exemptions no longer serve their historic purpose of shielding 
anticompetitive agreements among firms supervised by direct 
regulation from the conflicting demands of antitrust.  Instead, they 
primarily provide unnecessarily strong protection for conduct that 
would likely be lawful under modern antitrust law.  But if that is true, 
then (1) why would the parties to such agreements expend resources, 
make public disclosure of their plans, and invite administrative 
litigation in order to seek immunity for conduct that is probably 
lawful in any event?, and (2) is it in the public interest to continue to 
immunize these arrangements? 
The central empirical claim of this Article is testable by an analysis 
of the transactions that have received immunity.  An examination of 
the last ten years of agency actions in light of the plausible alternative 
explanations for the transaction or merger involved establishes the 
dramatic change in the economic functions of the overwhelming 
majority of the matters receiving antitrust immunity.4  Further, the 
 
1 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH NO. 24, FEDERAL STATUTORY 
EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW 33–52 (2007) [hereinafter ABA MONOGRAPH] 
(listing thirty statutory exemptions or modifications of antitrust law as of 2006). 
2 Part I has a fuller discussion of these exemptions. 
3 See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 193–216 (describing changes in railroad 
regulation); see also DANIEL J. SWEENEY ET AL., TRANSPORTATION DEREGULATION: 
WHAT’S DEREGULATED AND WHAT ISN’T (1986). 
4 As explained in more detail later, both the Department of Transportation (DOT) and 
the Surface Transportation Board (STB) must actually approve the transactions or 
combinations receiving immunity.  But the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is only a 
C
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outliers protecting conventional cartelistic or monopolistic activity are 
almost without exception contrary to the public interest. 
This leads to the question of why the participants in the 
transportation industry both seek to obtain antitrust immunities and 
work actively to retain these exemptions.  The hypothesis is that most 
of these transactions and ventures provide or are expected to provide 
efficiency gains, but in many cases, the value that the parties can 
capture is modest.  This may be because the gains themselves yield 
relatively little pecuniary advantage or because the inherently 
competitive nature of many transportation markets results in cost 
savings being competed away to the benefit of customers generally.  
Under such circumstances, the antitrust liability risks (i.e., the direct 
and indirect costs of litigation as well as the ex ante perception of 
costs and disruption) may deter parties from pursuing legitimate, 
efficiency-enhancing collaboration.  Hence, a robust protection from 
the possibility of antitrust litigation may ensure that the participants 
can enjoy the modest pecuniary gains from their efficiency-enhancing 
collaboration and provide an incentive to increasing efficiency in 
moving goods and people.  However, complete insulation from 
antitrust liability risk may well also provide parties with the hope and 
expectation of some additional gains resulting from the adoption of 
unnecessarily restrictive terms that facilitate either exploitation of 
customers or exclusion of competitors. 
An analysis of the agreements presented to the agencies would first 
provide insight into the kinds of transactions being proposed and 
could provide the basis of support for continuing some form of 
protection from antitrust liability.  Evidence that most transactions are 
not on their face efficiency-enhancing joint ventures would also 
weigh against continued protection of inefficient, cartelistic restraints 
on competition in transportation.  The analysis of agency actions is 
generally consistent with the hypotheses in the preceding paragraph.  
Further, it is reasonable to infer that, at least in part, the role of 
immunity for otherwise probably lawful ventures is to reduce the 
transaction cost risks associated with collaboration among 
competitors. 
If the foregoing hypotheses are correct, the current immunity 
provisions are maladapted to the tasks they now perform.  What is 
needed is access to a robust form of a time-limited, business review 
 
file keeper.  Basically, shipping companies enjoy immunity as a matter of law by filing a 
notice with the FMC concerning their activities.  See infra text accompanying notes 9–10. 
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clearance explicitly focused on avoiding unnecessarily 
anticompetitive agreements or mergers while providing better 
protection for legitimate, reasonable ventures.  However, because 
many of these ventures are probably both lawful and unlikely to 
produce any significant antitrust risks—either public or private—the 
step of seeking antitrust protection should be an option for the parties 
and need not be inherent in the process of reporting the venture to the 
relevant agency and obtaining whatever public interest approval may 
be necessary.5  The process should be based on the current review 
procedures already employed by the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) but should contain a more robust result, such as suspension of 
antitrust liability for the duration of that clearance, if the transaction 
or venture is found not to raise serious competitive concerns.  The 
relevant regulatory agencies should still play a primary role in the 
overall process because of the noncompetitive reasons for regulation 
of transportation services.  An additional insight of this analysis is 
that, even in a world in which market processes are central, it is 
important to retain regulatory oversight in transportation.  Antitrust 
immunity is a discrete and special issue relevant in the changed world 
of transportation to a limited set of ventures that raise significant risks 
of costly litigation that would offset the efficiency gains.  Only in 
such circumstances should the parties and the agencies have to 
concern themselves with this question. 
The analysis of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a 
brief summary of the six statutes that provide immunity for some 
aspect of transportation as well as the contemporary business review 
clearance process used by the Antitrust Division; Part II sets forth 
plausible alternative explanations for retaining antitrust immunity in 
the transportation industries; Part III then provides the empirical part 
of this Article, analyzing agency grants of antitrust immunity in light 
of the possible explanations for the transactions being immunized; 
Part IV explains why the exemption process is not well adapted to the 
needs of the parties or the public interest; Part V presents the basic 
concept of a robust business review clearance process; Part VI 
considers two arguments against the proposal; Part VII then identifies 
 
5 As discussed infra Part VII.C, notice to the agency overseeing the transportation 
sector is important for reasons outside of competition.  Moreover, because of the 
interconnected nature of air, rail, and, to a lesser extent, ocean transportation, changes 
within parts of such networks can have a variety of positive and negative externalities.  
The resulting impacts on economic activity warrant a more general public interest review 
than antitrust alone can provide. 
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and discusses some key elements of the process that involve 
important choices if it were to be implemented. 
I 
THE EXEMPTIONS AND THE BUSINESS REVIEW CLEARANCE LETTERS 
OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 
A.  The Statutory Exemptions for Transportation Industries 
There are six identifiable exemptions from antitrust law for various 
aspects of the transportation industries.  The exemptions include The 
Shipping Act, railroad exemptions, collective agreements among 
motor carriers, intercity bus mergers and acquisitions, international air 
carrier agreement exemptions, and airport congestion. 
1.  The Shipping Act6 
This statute exempts from antitrust law agreements that create and 
implement ocean shipping conferences, which are cartels in which 
competitors agree on prices for specific routes.  This is the oldest 
surviving exemption in the statute books, having been originally 
adopted around World War I.  Congress has revised it several times.  
The Federal Maritime Commission has oversight of industry conduct 
and establishes rules and regulations governing it.  Shipping 
companies must charge their customers either their posted tariffs or a 
price based on a specific contract.7  Historically, shipping conferences 
established those tariffs based on an agreement among members on 
rates for particular routes, which are published and to which 
adherence can be required.  Today, shipping companies must still 
have published tariffs either of their own or of the conference, but 
they may also enter into confidential agreements with shippers for 
terms other than the tariff rates.8  A wide range of agreements among 
shipping companies and ocean terminal operators are also immune 
from antitrust law when filed with the FMC.9 The Commission can 
commence proceedings to challenge such agreements only after the 
 
6 Pub. L. No. 98-237, 98 Stat. 67 (codified in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C. (2006)). 
7 46 U.S.C. § 40501 (2006). 
8 Id. § 40502 (establishing that these agreements are to be filed with the FMC, but the 
price terms are to remain confidential). 
9 Id. § 40301 (establishing the list of agreements); id. § 40303 (establishing the content 
requirements); id. § 40304 (establishing that agreements come into effect forty-five days 
after filing).  All such agreements are exempt from antitrust law.  Id. § 40305(a). 
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fact.10  Conferences are open to all carriers that want to participate.  
Despite the apparent sweep of the exemption, the courts have had to 
define and redefine its boundaries.11 
In 2006, the European Union, after extensive review, terminated its 
antitrust exemption for shipping conferences.12  This action further 
reduced the potential cartel gains of any exemption from only 
American antitrust law.  Indeed, in the summer of 2010, the media 
reported that the EU and U.S. authorities were investigating price 
fixing by general cargo lines.13 
2.  Railroad Exemptions14 
This statute, which replaced the Interstate Commerce Commission 
and Reed-Bulwinkle Acts15 as part of the deregulation of railroad 
 
10 Id. § 41307(b)(1) (authorizing the FMC to investigate and challenge agreements that 
harm competition).  Only the FMC can bring such a challenge.  Id. § 41301(a).  The FMC 
has the burden of proof in any such challenge.  Id. § 41307(b)(3).  The FMC has brought 
only one case under this section, and that was to challenge efforts by Long Beach and Los 
Angeles to coordinate air pollution regulation of trucks hauling containers into and out of 
the harbor area.  Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. City of Los Angeles, California, 607 F. Supp. 2d 
192 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a preliminary injunction to enjoin trucking programs at ports 
in Long Beach and Los Angeles). 
11 See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pac. Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966). 
12 Prior to 2006, the European Union had an exemption analogous to that in the United 
States.  See Council Regulation 4056/86, 1986 O.J. (L 378) (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31986R4056:EN:HTML.  The 
European Commission repealed this exemption in 2006, and new guidelines were to be 
developed to take its place.  See Press Release, European Union, Competition: Repeal of 
Block Exemption for Liner Shipping Conferences–Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 25, 
2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06 
/344&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  Interestingly, the 
European Union continued to allow joint ventures among shipping companies with an 
aggregate of less than thirty or thirty-five percent of the trade in a market through a “block 
exemption,” which is akin to an antitrust immunity; however, this exemption expired on 
April 25, 2010.  See Press Release, European Union, Antitrust: Commission Prolongs and 
Amends Block Exemption for Liner Shipping Consortia (Apr. 25, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/477&format=HTML&age
d=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  See generally Christopher Sagers, The Demise of 
Regulation in Ocean Shipping: A Study in the Evolution of Competition Policy and the 
Predictive Power of Microeconomics, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779 (2006). 
13 John W. Miller, U.S., EU Scrutinize Container Shipping Rates, WALL ST. J., June 1, 
2010, at B3. 
14 See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified in 
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (2006)) (abolishing the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
creating the Surface Transportation Board, and revising the statutes governing railroads 
including the exemptions). 
15 Ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10706 (2006)). 
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services, still delegates to the Surface Transportation Board (STB) 
exclusive authority to review and approve railroad mergers, and it 
confers the power to authorize restrictive terms in connection with 
such mergers or acquisitions.16  In addition, the STB can approve 
joint rate agreements among railroads, thereby conferring antitrust 
immunity.17  The substantive standards that the STB is to employ, 
given the deregulated nature of transportation, include a concern for 
competition; however, the STB is also instructed to consider a variety 
of other values, including sufficiency of revenue.18  The statute also 
modifies antitrust standards of proof for conspiracy claims when 
railroads are charged with price fixing outside the STB’s authority.19  
Those modified standards essentially require direct proof of 
conspiracy and reject the use of inferential lines of proof based on 
consciously parallel conduct. 
3.  Collective Agreements Among Motor Carriers20 
The provision authorizes agreements among motor carriers to set 
rates for moving household goods, general rules, through rates, joint 
rates, and classifications of freight.21  Thus, the statute permitted, 
with STB approval, rate fixing among competitors.  However, the 
statute allowed the trucking companies to enter into contracts with 
shippers at rates other than the rates set by the approved agreements.  
In fact, most trucking was done at a discount—often substantial—
from the posted rates prior to the STB decision to terminate the 
 
16 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) (2006). 
17 Id. § 10501(b) (declaring that the STB’s authority is “exclusive”); id. § 10706 
(authorizing the STB to recognize and regulate rate setting groups, i.e., rate bureaus, and 
imposing restrictions on the activities of such groups and appearing to focus then primarily 
on interline traffic agreements); id. § 10706(a)(5) (permitting the STB to authorize 
shippers that provide railcars for use by the railroads to enter into agreements among 
themselves with respect to negotiating rates for the railroads’ use of their equipment); see 
also id. § 11321(a). 
18 Id. § 11324.  Sufficiency of revenue stands in potentially significant conflict with the 
idea of vigorous competition. 
19 Id. § 10706(a)(3)(B)(ii) (noting that conspiracy may not “be inferred” from “similar 
action” nor are any lawful discussions or agreements “admissible” as evidence of 
collusion). 
20 Id. § 13703. 
21 Id. § 13703(f) (restricting the ability of motor carriers to enjoy the benefit of the filed 
rate doctrine with respect to “undercharge” claims that had been a major source of dispute 
in the 1990s).  Such claims arose when motor carriers discounted from filed tariffs and 
then sought to collect the difference between the discounted price and the tariff rate.  E.g., 
Sec. Servs., Inc. v. KMart Corp., 511 U.S. 431 (1994). 
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authorization for the trucking rate bureaus.  The STB had to approve 
these agreements under a public interest standard, and such approval 
carries an exemption from the antitrust laws.22  However, all such 
agreements could last no more than five years unless the STB 
reapproved the agreement.23  Another immunity exists to allow 
movers of household goods to enter into agreements with their agents 
concerning charges and ownership of moving vans.24  The STB can, 
on its own motion or at the request of a third party, review such 
activities and order modification or termination.25 
4.  Intercity Bus Mergers and Acquisitions26 
This provision grants the STB exclusive jurisdiction to review 
mergers, acquisitions, leases, and any other method of transferring 
control between or among bus companies engaged in interstate 
commerce.  The standard for approval is “public interest” that 
includes “adequacy of transportation” as well as the costs and impact 
on employees of the carrier that is acquired.27  The statute explicitly 
preempts antitrust law and “all other law, including State and 
municipal law, as necessary to . . . carry out the arrangement.”28 
5.  International Air Carrier Agreement Exemptions29 
In making the transition from regulated service to competitive 
service in domestic air travel, Congress recognized two contexts 
involving international air services in which the secretary of 
transportation might grant antitrust exemptions.  The first involves 
cooperative agreements involving international air travel.30  The 
second involves “mutual aid agreements” when there is a strike 
 
22 49 U.S.C. § 13703(a)(6). 
23 Id. § 13703(c). 
24 Id. § 13907(d)(1). 
25 Id. § 13907(d)(2).  This provision immunizes conduct involving the joint ventures 
among local movers and a national coordination system, whether the agreements were 
vertical or horizontal, despite the fact that the one case in the area, Rothery Storage & Van 
Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d. 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), resulted in a dismissal of the 
antitrust claims against the venture. 
26 49 U.S.C. § 14303. 
27 Id. § 14303(b). 
28 Id. § 14303(f). 
29 Id. §§ 41308–41309, 42111. 
30 Id. § 41309(b) (requiring approval of any cooperative agreement and establishing 
standards for approval, including a requirement that there be no less anticompetitive 
method of achieving the primary goal of the agreement); id. § 41309(b)(1)(B). 
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affecting international service of an air carrier.31  Both impose 
restrictive standards before the secretary can approve the agreement.32  
An antitrust exemption exists only if the secretary makes a separate 
finding that an exemption is “required by the public interest” and then 
only “to the extent necessary to allow the person to proceed with the 
transaction specifically approved . . . .”33  Moreover, such exemptions 
must be periodically reviewed and reapproved. 
6.  Airport Congestion34 
This statute, enacted in 2003, authorizes the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to develop a pilot program for reducing 
congestion at airports.  The program may include “collaborative 
decision making among carriers at [designated] airports,” with the 
acquiescence of the Attorney General.35  Unless the Attorney General 
objects within five days of notice, the Secretary of Transportation 
may confer an exemption from antitrust law.36  This statute, therefore, 
exempts agreements among competitors to allocate landing rights, 
which are a central form of non-price competition.  Congress 
authorized this program for two years.  It was to expire in 2005, but if 
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Transportation agreed, it 
could be extended for two more years to 2007.37  However, the 
current version of the U.S. Code still contains this provision raising 
the question of whether it is still available to facilitate collective 
action by airlines. 
Three administrative agencies are responsible for these six 
exemptions.  The FMC has one exemption; the Department of 
Transportation (DOT), which includes the FAA, oversees two 
exemptions; and the STB has three exemptions.  Although the STB is 
nominally part of the DOT, the STB operates as an independent 
regulatory agency.  Except for the airport congestion exemption, these 
immunity provisions have their roots in the period when all 
transportation was subject to direct regulation of rates, services, and 
 
31 Id. § 42111.  The agreement may provide for only sixty percent of the losses, may 
apply to only eight weeks of losses, and may not apply to the first thirty days of a strike, 
and the dispute must be arbitrated at the request of the striking employees.  Id. 
32 Id. § 41308(b). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. § 40129. 
35 Id. § 40129(c)(1)(B). 
36 Id. § 40129(h)(1). 
37 Id. § 40129(k). 
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routes to be served.  In that era, all providers had to adhere to 
published tariffs, and they could not compete with respect to prices.  
Only gradually, the market process came to dominate the pricing of 
transportation.  But even as it has, the old exemptions from antitrust 
law remain on the books. 
B.  The Business Review Clearance Process 
The current system codified in the Code of Federal Regulations 
requires parties to submit their proposals to the Antitrust Division 
prior to taking any action to initiate the activity.38  The Antitrust 
Division, after review, will issue a letter stating its enforcement 
intent.39  The statement has no formal legal significance,40 but courts 
frequently cite this review as a factor in judicial approval of such 
arrangements.41  Indeed, there is no reported case in which an 
approved agreement was subsequently held to be unlawful.42  This 
may be reflective only of a conservative review process, but the more 
plausible explanation is that, when the DOJ approves an agreement 
that is close to the line of legality, this review provides substantial 
creditability for the agreement’s claim to legality. 
It would appear that, in response to the initial request for approval, 
the Antitrust Division’s attorneys will negotiate with the parties 
requesting clearance in order to modify or clarify the nature of the 
conduct and its competitive implications.  Hence, the parties have 
some ability to revise their agreements to satisfy the views of the 
Antitrust Division. 
The Antitrust Division’s current business review program is not 
available for most of the conduct of concern in this Article—various 
kinds of agreements and mergers in the transport sector that can 
 
38 FTC Statements of Policy, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(2) (2010) (“The Division will consider 
only requests with respect to proposed business conduct . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
39 Id. § 50.10. 
40 Id. § 50.9 (“[The] letter states only the enforcement intention of the Division . . . .”). 
41 E.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Cinram Int’l, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 370, 379 (D. 
Del. 2004) (“Furthermore, the court does not overlook the fact that the DOJ issued a 
Business Review Letter concluding that the 6C Pool was not likely to violate antitrust 
laws.  The court appreciates the DOJ’s familiarity and experience analyzing complex 
pooling arrangements and is strongly persuaded by the DOJ’s conclusions.”). 
42 However, in at least one situation, the court found that the alleged conduct was not 
within the scope of the matters covered by the clearance and thus held that the matter 
could proceed.  Chase v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Mich. 1999) 
(distinguishing the conspiracy at issue from that which had been cleared by a review 
letter). 
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currently qualify for antitrust immunity if they are first approved by 
industry-specific regulators.  First, the business review program 
currently applies only to new proposals.  If the conduct or agreement 
already exists, it will not qualify for clearance.  Second, the clearance 
is of indefinite duration.  There is no record of the Antitrust Division 
revisiting and reconsidering matters that it has approved, even though 
its letters reserve the right to do so.  Hence, when an industry is 
subject to significant change over time, there is no automatic way to 
get reconsideration of clearances that may no longer be reasonable.  
Third, the clearance process is available to review only section 1 type 
agreements.  Neither merger nor monopoly conduct is considered, but 
merger analysis has a different pre-consummation review process 
through the Hart-Scott-Rodino legislation.43  There is no readily 
available method for a dominant firm to get review and approval of 
any course of conduct that might arguably involve a violation of 
section 2 of the Sherman Act.  However, the matters subject to review 
and immunization by the transportation regulatory agencies all 
involve either agreements among firms or mergers.  Hence, for 
purposes of this analysis, it is feasible to focus on those areas of 
antitrust law, having noted that there might be room for an expansion 
of the business review concept to cover single firm conduct, much as 
the European Union currently does.44 
II 
THE POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR 
THE EXEMPTIONS 
There are two general explanations for why, despite the movement 
to embrace competition in the transportation industries, the 
exemptions from antitrust law retain significant support among the 
affected firms.  This Part sets forth the alternative explanations and 
suggests the ways in which the matters given immunity can be tested 
to determine which of the contending theories best explains the result. 
A.  Cartel and Monopoly Benefits Still Exist Even if Reduced 
It may be that the right to coordinate competition—whether by a 
shipping conference, railroad, trucking or intercity bus rate bureau, or 
 
43 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 
1383 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006)). 
44 See Council Regulation 1/2003, para. 14, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 4 (permitting declaratory 
decisions only in extraordinary cases). 
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the International Air Travel Association (IATA)45—still provides 
some modest cartelistic benefits.  The exchange of competitively 
sensitive information and the setting of base rates may provide a point 
of departure for “competitive” pricing that makes it more likely that 
industry members will be able to keep prices somewhat above the 
level that full competition would produce.46  For example, to the 
extent that it is possible to differentiate among groups of customers, 
establishing default prices may facilitate the exploitation of those 
customers with the least elastic demand and the highest search costs.  
Another potential abuse is to coordinate charges for “ancillary 
services” which are often essential to the transportation of goods from 
one point to another.  Similarly, an agreement among competitors to 
set, for example, a “fuel surcharge” might actually be a means to 
inflate prices outside the basic charge for services.47  Many outside 
observers believe that this is the primary consequence of retaining 
these exemptions and the associated collective activity.  This 
explanation would also suggest that the underlying anticompetitive 
objectives that the exemptions shielded historically remain the 
primary objective today, even if their impact on competition may be 
less. 
If the primary goal of transactions and agreements seeking 
immunity is this kind of market exploitation, it should be obvious 
from the nature of the agreement.  The parties to the agreement would 
have no relationship to each other except as competitors in the 
market.  They would then be using the agency approval as a means of 
insulating their coordination of pricing and output from antitrust 
liability. 
 
45 IATA is the international entity through which airlines coordinate a great deal of their 
activities.  Alliances are approved on condition that the parties not participate in IATA 
coordinated rate setting with respect to the services to any country whose airline is in any 
immunized alliance.  See, e.g., Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.p.A., DOT Order 2008-5-
32, 2008 WL 5550453 (Dep’t of Transp. May 22, 2008) (final order) (“We direct [the 
parties] . . . to withdraw, or to remain withdrawn, from participation in any International 
Air Transport Association tariff coordination activities that discuss any proposed through 
fares, rates, or charges applicable between the United States and any countries whose 
airlines have been or are subsequently granted antitrust immunity, or renewal thereof, to 
participate in similar alliance activities with a U.S. airline(s).”). 
46 Cf. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 336–37 (1969) 
(exchanging customer-specific prices allowed conspirators to keep prices above a 
competitive level despite entry and excess capacity). 
47 In the case of airlines, a number of airlines have paid fines for engaging in such a 
price-setting activity.  In ocean shipping, the concern is often about agreements setting the 
terms for transferring containers from ships to other modes of transportation. 
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The one major challenge to classification on the naked cartel side 
of the ledger will be those agreements that serve as the means to set 
uniform standards for the network aspects of these industries.  The 
definition and test for such agreements is discussed below. 
B.  Contemporary Transportation Coordination Often Benefits from 
Legitimate Collective Action 
On the other hand, there might be efficiency-enhancing reasons 
that exemptions are still valued.  Even if the exemptions traditionally 
served only to shield cartel and monopoly behavior, it may be that 
changing market conditions and technology have fundamentally 
altered the exemptions’ functions.  The protected conduct may 
involve two types of economically efficient activities. 
1.  Legitimate Joint Ventures 
The exemptions may shield the creation and implementation of 
joint ventures to provide services.  Such ventures would involve 
enterprises that are actual or potential competitors, and the resulting 
agreements would be likely to affect prices, areas of operation, 
allocation of business, and limits on membership.  Such agreements 
would likely include terms resembling horizontal price fixing, 
customer or territorial allocations, and refusals to deal that resemble 
boycotts.  All of these are per se violations under older antitrust case 
law.  However, recent case law48 has restored the ancillary restraint 
analysis of United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.49  Under 
Addyston Pipe, joint ventures are subject to a rule of reason that asks 
(1) whether there is a legitimate joint venture or transaction; (2) if so, 
whether it is subject to the risks of opportunistic conduct or otherwise 
requires restraints on the parties in order to achieve its legitimate 
objectives; (3) if so, whether the restraints at issue function to achieve 
the legitimate needs of the venture; and (4) whether there are any less 
restrictive ways to achieve the primary objective that would have 
 
48 See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010); Texaco 
Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & 
Printing, Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).  
But see PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(condemning a restraint after a “quick look,” despite the efforts of the parties to claim the 
agreement was ancillary to their joint venture). 
49 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
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been reasonable options at the time of the transaction or venture.50  In 
many contexts, however, a convincing prima facie claim that there is 
a legitimate venture and that the restraints are at least arguably 
ancillary to that venture will suffice to create a presumption of 
legality.51 
The appropriate test for whether results are ancillary is found in the 
first three steps listed above.  The parties to the restraint should be (1) 
engaged in a legitimate productive transaction or venture that (2) 
faces risks of opportunism or needs to define (i.e., restrain) the role of 
participants and that (3) the restraint at issue functions to resolve.  
Such an agreement falls in the category of presumptive legality even 
if, upon further inspection, the agreement is overbroad or contains 
unnecessary restraints.  While such restraints are arguably 
unreasonable, the dominant contemporary version of the “rule of 
reason” requires an initial showing of market power on the part of the 
party or parties imposing such a restraint once the initial prima facie 
legitimacy of the transaction or venture is established.52  Thus, the 
absence of market power creates a strong presumption of legality.  
There is also a small subset of cases involving direct competitors that 
have agreed to restrain their independent economic activity, which 
suggests that some restraints may be presumptively illegal.53 
 
50 See, e.g., United States v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003); Gen. 
Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984).  This analysis 
is discussed in Peter C. Carstensen & Richard F. Dahlson, Vertical Restraints in Beer 
Distribution: A Study of the Business Justifications for and Legal Analysis of Restricting 
Competition, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1986). 
51 The presumption of legality is manifest in the usual statement by courts that a 
restraint functionally associated with “pro-competitive” conduct (i.e., legitimate joint 
venture) can be challenged only if the plaintiff can plausibly allege that the defendant has 
market power.  See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 296 & n.7. 
52 See, e.g., VISA U.S.A., 334 F.3d 229. 
53 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (holding the 
restraint on resale competition by members of a grocery buying group to be presumptively 
illegal).  See generally Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam) 
(holding that a market allocation agreement associated with “franchise” was nevertheless 
per se illegal based on lack of justification); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 
U.S. 332 (1982) (holding that an agreement among competing doctors to set “maximum” 
prices was illegal as unnecessary to legitimate aspects of their joint venture to provide 
specific services to health insurers); PolyGram Holding, 416 F.3d 29 (holding a price-
fixing agreement between joint venturers illegal based on a “quick look” because it related 
to products outside the venture); Peter C. Carstensen & Harry First, Rambling Through 
Economic Theory: Topco’s Closer Look, in ANTITRUST STORIES 171 (Daniel A. Crane & 
Eleanor M. Fox eds., 2007). 
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If such restraints are likely to be lawful, especially in industries 
with modest overall concentration levels, such as trucking, air travel, 
and ocean shipping, why would parties want the benefit of immunity 
from antitrust challenges?54  Any venture poses risks that can 
outweigh its value to the parties.  In particular, if the expected gains 
to the firm from the transaction are modest, uncertain, or likely to be 
dissipated through competition, this would reduce the incentive for 
the parties to engage in the transaction.  Thus, when the economic 
gains to the parties are likely to be modest relative to the perceived 
risk of litigation, the parties may forego the opportunity to engage in 
legitimate, efficiency-enhancing collaboration.  This analysis assumes 
also that the efficiency gain can come only from some form of 
collaborative activity.  Hence, there is an unambiguous loss if the 
venture does not occur.  If individual firms can achieve the benefits 
on their own, then obstructing one alternative does not create the 
same social costs.  If unilateral options are more costly, however, 
there is still some social inefficiency when the best option is 
precluded. 
In addition, if parties can secure immunity from antitrust liability, 
this will affect the incentives that they have in developing their 
legitimate venture.  Immunity means that the parties have the 
opportunity, if the economics of the situation permit, to impose more 
restrictive terms than necessary in order to facilitate either greater 
exploitation of customers or exclusion of rivals.  An antitrust analysis 
of a legitimate joint venture, especially one with any degree of market 
dominance, requires critical review of any significantly 
anticompetitive restraints when a plausible case can be made that less 
restrictive options would have provided sufficient protection for the 
legitimate interests and needs of the parties.  Thus, the presence of a 
real antitrust review is likely to play a role in inducing parties to look 
for the least restrictive controls consistent with their primary 
objectives.  Absent that incentive, the parties may well adopt 
unnecessarily anticompetitive restraints whenever such restraints will 
either directly advantage the parties or create a barrier to new entry. 
 
54 There is high concentration in most railroad service markets.  Hence, any agreement 
imposing restraints ought to be subject to stricter scrutiny under antitrust law.  Thus, 
continued pursuit of antitrust immunity has more plausibility in that field of transportation. 
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2.  Standard Setting for Transportation Networks 
The second collective activity in which these industries engage 
involves market facilitation by collective agreement.  This is a form 
of standard setting in a general sense.  The size of containers and the 
contract terms under which containers will move into intermodal 
service, the terms for exchanging rail cars or franchising travel 
agents55 and for ensuring the integrity of the reservation system, and 
other similar activities are necessary components of market 
facilitation.  The standardization of railroad track width is an example 
of the impact of the network nature of the transportation business.  
Without standardization, it would be impossible to switch cars from 
one line to another, and equipment producers would have experienced 
diseconomies as a result of having to satisfy a variety of different 
gauges.56 
Moreover, with the rise of intermodalism in freight transport, there 
is a need to agree about a variety of standards to facilitate the efficient 
operation of the market.  This involves standardization both of 
physical components and of the contractual and other transactional 
elements of the business of moving goods.57  Even in passenger 
transport, especially when agents are used, there may be a need for 
standardized contract terms, and the carriers need to have some 
system for oversight of the integrity and financial responsibility of 
such agents.  Once again, there are public interest arguments for 
coordination of these aspects to facilitate efficient market operation.  
Such conduct, however, whether with respect to freight or passengers, 
is facially comparable to cartelistic conduct because both exclude 
 
55 See Chase v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (discussing 
the role of Airport Reporting Corporation, a joint venture of all major American airlines, 
in overseeing travel agents selling tickets for airlines). 
56 Prussian railroads quickly established a uniform gauge that facilitated the growth of 
rail traffic connecting various parts of the country, as well as adjacent countries.  In 
contrast, early American railroads failed to establish a uniform gauge for trains.  The result 
was a “fragmented network” in which local interests “did their best to prevent the 
development of through traffic.” COLLEEN A. DUNLAVY, POLITICS AND 
INDUSTRIALIZATION: EARLY RAILROADS IN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA 198 
(1994); accord id. at 195–201. 
57 The Supreme Court has resolved the tension between the railroad statutes governing 
liability for railroad accidents and the conflicting rules for ocean transportation.  The 
problem arises because of the use of intermodal contracts moving goods directly from 
foreign producers to inland American buyers via containers transported by ship and rail.  
See Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433 (2010) (holding 
the ocean shipping contract to preempt the railroad liability rules). 
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alternatives and commit the parties to a uniform method of business.58  
The need for such standards remains vital to the transportation 
industries, but at the same time, agreements imposing such standards 
are more readily challenged as antitrust violations in the absence of 
some form of immunity. 
Congress, through the Standard Development Organization 
Advancement Act (SDOAA), has determined that standard setting 
needs to be treated differently from ordinary cartel behavior.59  The 
Act requires the organization to employ an open policy with respect 
to participation by all stakeholders and to reach decisions in a 
consensus manner.  This qualified recognition of the need for 
standard setting also signals that there is a real concern that the 
process of setting standards can be abused to undermine competition 
or to exclude competitors without justification.60  An important 
difference from the general standard-setting context of the SDOAA is 
that any private group’s proposal for transportation industry standards 
in railroad, trucking, airline, and intercity bus service would be 
subject to review on the merits by the regulatory agency using 
procedures in which all stakeholders can participate.61  Moreover, the 
resulting standards are usually imbedded in regulations that all firms 
must obey. 
III 
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
We have collected and summarized the actions of the three 
transportation agencies insofar as we can locate them for the past 
decade.62  In general, the following descriptions do not attempt to go 
 
58 See Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing 
Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 941 (2000) (explaining how many naked 
restraints involve limits on how the parties will compete by setting standards or other 
limits on competition rather than directly controlling prices or output). 
59 Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4305 
(2006)).  For a discussion of the Act and its justification, see ABA MONOGRAPH, supra 
note 1, at 263–76. 
60 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); Am. 
Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982). 
61 It is less clear whether the FMC has comparable ability to review standards set by 
ocean shipping firms. 
62 The empirical discussion of this Article rests on data compiled from decisions and 
filings with the STB, as well as decisions available elsewhere in reported sources.  The 
data are available at Peter C. Carstensen, Anti-trust Research, U. WIS. L. SCH., http: 
//hosted.law.wisc.edu/faculty/carstensen/index.html (last updated Oct. 26, 2010).  
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behind the text of the orders except in the most minimal way.  The 
goal is to examine the reported facts to determine a facial 
characterization of the agreements while examining a few specific 
matters in a little more detail to highlight some issues. The decisions 
of the STB, however, allow more evaluation because of the partial 
change in policy from that agency. 
A.  The Transactions and Agreements Approved by the Agencies 
1.  The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) 
The FMC produced the largest number of actions.  In the period 
under review, there were about 220 exemptions reported by the FMC.  
Only six involved traditional shipping conferences (i.e., cartels).  
Another thirty-six involved “rate discussion” agreements.  These 
agreements are varied as to participants and objectives.  Some 
agreements appear to be aimed largely at coordinating prices or other 
practices among competitors,63 but others seems to involve the 
development of shared facilities, ships, or coordinated services.64  
The dominant type of agreement, however, involved capacity 
allocation plans, granting rights to use capacity on another company’s 
ship, or an agreement between two shipping companies to coordinate 
their sailings between two or more destinations.  Both of these 
activities fit the joint venture mold because, by working together, the 
parties can better fit capacity to demand either by sharing use of a 
ship or by coordinating ship operations to ensure more efficient 
operation.  Of course, merely coordinating sailing dates is also very 
much like a naked allocation of the market.  Without more detail than 
 
References throughout this Article are made to specific documents organized within 
folders separated by industry type.  This Article also makes observations based on the 
number of filings made and the outcome of those filings.  The data on which those 
calculations were made are also available from the author. 
63 For example, the one agreement challenged by the FMC involved a discussion 
agreement between Long Beach and Los Angeles on implementing rules to reduce air 
pollution resulting from trucks hauling containers from the harbor to other locations.  See 
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. City of Los Angeles, California, 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D.D.C. 
2009).  Others involve conduct that would appear blatantly illegal.  Compare The Credit 
Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 202-011353-028 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n June 8, 1999) (on 
file with author) (“The purpose of the Agreement is to enable the parties to develop and 
implement uniform credit rules, practices, procedures and policies in the trade.”), with 
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam) (finding it is per se 
illegal for competitors to agree on credit terms). 
64 See, e.g., NYK/WWL/NSCSA Cooperative Working Agreement, FMC No. 203-
011584-006 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Jan. 24, 2006) (on file with author) (arguably an effort to 
develop a joint venture to serve the eastern Mediterranean and other Middle Eastern ports). 
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the documents provide, it is not feasible to tell whether, in some 
cases, there is more than an agreement to limit competition by 
staggering sailing times, which would lead to reduced shipper 
choices. 
The data set shows that the FMC reported (recall that the FMC has 
no power to reject proposals) 150 vessel-sharing agreements.65  Such 
agreements often involve commitments to share space on container 
ships that are operated by two or more companies serving the same 
set of routes.  Another twenty-seven agreements involved greater 
coordination (e.g., alliances) or other kinds of joint service or 
equipment sharing.66  What the agreements do not reveal is the scope 
or extent of competition remaining on the routes affected by these 
agreements.  Many of the same major ship lines recur as participants 
in the agreements.  There is, however, no analysis showing the impact 
on shipper choices resulting from the combinations. 
Another illustrative example is that several marine terminals 
created “chassis pools” for the chassis on which containers were 
 
65 See, e.g., Grand Alliance/Zim Transpacific Vessel Sharing Agreement, FMC 
Agreement No. 012063-001 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with author); “K” 
Line/Abou Merhi Space Charter and Coop. Working Agreement, FMC No. 012066 (Fed. 
Mar. Comm’n Mar. 26, 2009) (on file with author); YMUK/CSCL Cross Slot Charter 
Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 012065 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Mar. 17, 2009) (on file with 
author); “K” Line, PIL and WHS Transpacific Charter Agreement, FMC No. 012062 (Fed. 
Mar. Comm’n Feb. 20, 2009) (on file with author); CSAV Grp. Coop. Working 
Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 011672-005 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Oct. 31, 2006) (on file 
with author); U.S. Flag Roll-on Roll-off Carriers Vessel Schedule Discussion and 
Voluntary Adherence Agreement, FMC No. 011949 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2006) 
(cooperative working agreement) (on file with author); Space Charter and Coop. Working 
Agreement Between NYK and WWL, FMC No. 232-011443-004 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n 
Dec. 30, 2005) (on file with author); Agreement Between CSAV and Mitsui, FMC 
Agreement No. 217-011545-001 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Mar. 26, 2000) (on file with author). 
66 See, e.g., Maersk Line/CMA CGM Coop. Working Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 
012055 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Oct. 31, 2008) (on file with author); The Höegh/Maersk 
Ancillary Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 012027 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Mar. 17, 2008) 
(on file with author); The Grand Alliance Agreement II, FMC Agreement No. 203-
011602-011 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Dec. 17, 2007) (on file with author); Evergreen Line 
Joint Serv. Agreement, FMC No. 011982 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Jan. 14, 2007) (on file with 
author); S. Atl. Chassis Pool Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 011980 (Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n Dec. 20, 2006) (on file with author); BBC Chartering & Logistic—Caytrans 
Project Servs. (Ams.) Joint Serv. Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 011970 (Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with author); Consol. Chassis Mgmt. Pool Agreement, 
FMC Agreement No. 011962 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n June 30, 2006) (on file with author); 
The New World Alliance Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 011960 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n 
June 30, 2006) (on file with author). 
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placed.67  By pooling these interchangeable components, marine 
terminals presumably achieved real efficiencies.  The unexplored 
question is whether the pools engaged in exclusionary or exploitative 
practices beyond what was essential to sharing resources. 
Thus, at least eighty percent of the agreements filed in the period 
from 2000 to 2009 involve prima facie joint ventures.  This is not 
entirely surprising because the 1998 revisions in the underlying 
statute effectively discouraged conventional conference-type 
cartels.68  At the same time, the substantial number of “discussion” 
agreements, which immunize discussion by shipping companies on 
prices for shipping as well as ancillary services and intermodal 
operations, suggests that the industry leaders still see gains from 
cartelistic coordination even if the coordination has to be on a 
voluntary basis with clearly articulated limits on the use of coercive 
practices.  Moreover, large shippers can (and most do) enter into 
separate agreements with shipping lines regarding the prices the large 
shippers will pay for service.  Thus, the tariff prices are, for the bulk 
of the business, the starting point for such negotiations.  Given a 
moderately competitive market, volume buyers are likely to have 
substantial negotiating power as long as capacity is at or above the 
level of demand.69  Indeed, the FMC has estimated that over eighty 
percent of general cargo is now shipped under individual contracts 
outside the conference rate system.70 
Several factors are troublesome from an efficiency- and workable 
competition-promoting perspective.  First, the statutory scheme 
denies the FMC any capacity to review critically and reject or restrict 
agreements when they are filed.  This invites shipping companies to 
seek to maximize their market exploitation and cartelization even if 
 
67 See, e.g., Consol. Chassis Mgmt. Pool Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 011962 
(Fed. Mar. Comm’n June 30, 2006) (on file with author). 
68 See Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-258, 112 Stat. 1902 (1998) 
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701–1719 (2006)).  For a fuller discussion of 
the reforms in the ocean shipping industry, see generally ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, 
at 161–89. 
69 For a discussion of buyer power and its competitive effects, see Peter C. Carstensen, 
Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and 
Antitrust Policy, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2010); Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer 
Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination 
Among Suppliers, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 271 (2008).  See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & 
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (2010). 
70 FED. MAR. COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF THE OCEAN SHIPPING REFORM ACT OF 1998, 
at 2 (2001), available at http://www.fmc.gov/assets/1/Page/OSRA_Study.pdf; see also 
ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 171. 
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much of the business has moved out from under the aegis of the 
conference system.  Second, the discussion agreements and other 
coordinating devices can facilitate the voluntary avoidance of 
vigorous price and service competition.  There are data that suggest 
that prices have not declined as much as the efficiency gains in the 
container business would have suggested if the markets were more 
competitive.71  Third, as fixed investments in both vessels and 
terminals have increased, the resulting barriers to entry make it easier 
for coordination to work as the risk of entry is much reduced.  The 
changing nature of entry conditions probably explains in substantial 
part why, despite a downturn in demand for container service in 2009, 
prices did not decline radically and then increased in 2010 with the 
revival of demand.  Interestingly, the major companies have not 
added capacity, which exists in mothballed container ships, in step 
with growing demand.  As a result, by the middle of 2010, there was a 
serious problem of access to container capacity.72 
At the same time, it appears likely that some liner service involves 
markets with high levels of concentration because of the specific 
nature of the point-to-point service involved.  Hence, any joint 
venture may well raise competitive concerns.  Thus, if the risks of 
costly litigation loom large, they may be a substantial disincentive to 
engage in efficiency-enhancing joint ventures.  In addition, some 
uniform standards are probably essential for intermodal service, in 
terms of both the physical characteristics and in the contractual 
arrangements.  Discussion agreements aimed at proposing standards 
would, therefore, have potential merit. 
2.  The STB 
Three types of transportation are eligible for the immunizations 
provided by the STB: rail, intercity bus, and truck services.  The 
agency’s record is mixed.  It has shown great concern for enhancing 
competition in trucking and, to a somewhat lesser degree, for intercity 
bus service.  On the other hand, the agency has approved, with 
immunity, a massive consolidation of railroads, and even more 
troubling, it has allowed the sale by major rail companies of short 
lines and low traffic lines on terms that severely restrict the access of 
shippers on those short lines to competing carriers. 
 
71 ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 182–83. 
72 See Miller, supra note 13. 
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a.  Rail Transactions 
While the STB has approved a massive consolidation of railroads 
in the past, no major mergers have occurred in the past ten years.  
This is in part a consequence of the STB’s revised merger policy, 
which it adopted in 2001, that imposed a much stronger competitive 
effect analysis.73  Under that policy, none of the surviving major 
railroads are likely to be allowed to merge with any other such rail 
line.  Since 2000, the STB has, however, approved five minor rail 
mergers and acquisitions.74 
Since 2000, the STB has not had occasion to review and approve 
the sale of a short line by a major railroad.  It has, however, been 
obliged to consider its policy on paper barriers.  Paper barriers are the 
barriers that a seller imposes on the buyer or lessee of a short line that 
restrict the operator’s ability to deliver traffic to any other railroad 
with which the short line connects. 
In 1998, the STB began a reconsideration of paper barriers, but it 
did not prove very successful.75  In response to renewed demands by 
shippers that they have greater freedom to select the carriers that 
would transport their goods, the STB issued a major decision in 2007 
that also adopted new regulations.76 
From a competitive policy perspective, the most striking aspect of 
the 2007 decision was the implicit admission that, up to that point, the 
STB had not bothered to ask about or review the merits of any of the 
paper barriers included in the sale or lease of rail lines.  As a result, 
some barriers require that, if the buyer or lessee sends any traffic to 
any other line, that short line immediately reverts to its prior owner.  
Other agreements impose increased lease or post-sale payment 
requirements, and many imposed costs disproportionate to any 
 
73 Railroad Acquisition, Control, Merger, Consolidation Project, Trackage Rights, and 
Lease Procedures, 49 C.F.R. § 1180.1 (2010). 
74 Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., STB Fin. Docket No. 35081, 2008 WL 4415850 (Surface 
Transp. Bd. Sept. 30, 2008); Norfolk S. Corp., STB Fin. 34839, 2007 WL 482682 (Surface 
Transp. Bd. Feb. 15, 2007); Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co., STB Fin. Docket No. 34424, 2004 
WL 761305 (Surface Transp. Bd. Apr. 9, 2004); CSX Corp., STB Fin. Docket No. 33388, 
2001 WL 92978 (Surface Transp. Bd. Feb. 2, 2001); Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co., STB Fin. 
Docket No. 34000, 2001 WL 1021920 (Surface Transp. Bd. Sept. 7, 2001); CSX Corp., 
STB Fin. Docket No. 33388, 2001 WL 1586968 (Surface Transp. Bd. Dec. 13, 2001); 
Railamerica, Inc.–Control Exemption–Railtex, Inc., 4 S.T.B. 479 (2000). 
75 See Review of Rail Access and Competition Issues, 3 S.T.B. 92 (1998). 
76 Review of Rail Access and Competition Issues, STB Ex Parte No. 575 (Surface 
Transp. Bd. Oct. 29, 2007), available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/readingroom.nsf 
/WebDecisionID/36758?OpenDocument. 
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reasonable measure of value.  Moreover, many of these restraints 
continue indefinitely! 
The STB decided, however, not to undo or restrict existing 
agreements, even though many had been in place for fifteen or twenty 
years.  It did belatedly decide to require that any future transaction 
reveal any such restraints.77  In addition, the STB authorized 
expedited discovery of existing barriers by any shipper claiming 
adverse effects.  But it did not require that all existing barriers be 
disclosed to the agency, nor did it adopt a view that some barriers 
(e.g., the use of forfeitures) would be inherently unreasonable.  
Instead, invoking the spirit of an old saying by Bill Cosby (“I brought 
you in this world, and I can take you out.”78), the STB argued that, 
because the major line could have retained ownership and control, 
any restrictions on the use of the line by the buyer or lessee, however 
long or onerous, had no adverse effect on competition.  This analysis 
ignored the fact that rail lines are affected with a duty to serve the 
public interest, and rights of ownership were always subject to 
administrative constraints.79  Had the STB required disclosure of the 
paper barriers at the time of the transactions, it could have (and 
certainly should have) imposed limits on the duration and scope of 
such limits on the freedom of action of the buyer or lessee of the short 
line.80 
The STB’s refusal to adopt any general policies that would impose 
forward-looking constraints on the use of existing paper barriers is 
troublesome.  Had it identified both time limits for such barriers (e.g., 
five or ten years following the initial sale or lease) and imposed some 
presumptions of invalidity on the most excessive barriers, it is likely 
 
77 See 49 C.F.R. § 1150.43(h) (2010). 
78 Memorable Quotes for Bill Cosby: Himself, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083 
652/quotes (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
79 Public interest concerns also have not kept the STB from showing continued support 
for paper barriers.  See, e.g., Northern Plains Railroad, Inc.—Lease Exemption—Soo Line 
Railroad Company, 75 Fed. Reg. 47,678 (Aug. 6, 2010) (proposing a twenty-year lease, 
which renewed a prior lease, to retain the prohibition on a lessee’s delivery of traffic to 
any of three other railroads it connects with and slating the notice of exemption for 
expedited review over the dissent of one commissioner). 
80 See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 207–08; see also Salvatore Massa, A Tale of 
Two Monopolies: Why Removing Paper Barriers Is a Good Idea, TRANSP. J., 
Winter/Spring 2001, at 47.  For another strategy to deal with the problem of paper barriers, 
see Reply for Entergy Arkansas, Inc., Docket No. 42104, (July 21, 2010) (on file with 
author); Entergy Arkansas, Inc., STB Docket No. 42104 (Surface Transp. Bd. Sept. 8, 
2009) (on file with author) (challenging the paper barrier that kept short line from 
interchanging traffic with railroads other than the Union Pacific Railroad). 
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that the short lines would have been better positioned to negotiate 
modifications or terminations of long-standing barriers.  The case of 
paper barriers is, therefore, an example of how agency action and 
associated antitrust immunity results in excessive protection of 
incumbent market dominance to the detriment of shippers seeking the 
most efficient and least costly transportation.  Transferring short lines 
or low volume lines to specialized operators can enhance efficiency, 
and there are plausible reasons why the seller might legitimately seek 
to retain some or all of the volume of traffic generated on that line for 
a reasonable transition period.  The problem is that the STB did not 
critically review the justifications for continued imposition of 
anticompetitive restraints on the operators of these independent rail 
lines. 
b.  Trucks and Buses 
With respect to trucks and buses, there has been a clear change in 
STB policy.  In 2001, 2002, and again in 2003, the STB approved, 
with reservations, the continuation of cartelistic rate bureaus for both 
industries.81  In the case of trucks, regional rate bureaus set “baseline” 
rates for hundreds of different commodities in conjunction with a 
commodity classification system administered by these same parties.  
The participating trucking companies, however, were not required to 
adhere to those rates, and most freight moved at substantial discounts 
from the posted rates.82  In reviewing this system, the STB expressed 
concern that it resulted in a few shippers paying excessive prices 
while the larger volume shippers got the benefit of significant 
discounts.  In addition, the use of an excessively high posted price 
created a deceptive sense of cost savings.  The pricing system in turn 
depended on a commodity classification system carried out by a 
 
81 EC–Mac Motor Carriers Serv. Ass’n, STB Section 5a Application No. 118, 2003 WL 
1565201 (Surface Transp. Bd. Mar. 21, 2003); Application of the Nat’l Bus Traffic Ass’n, 
Section 5a Application No. 9, 2002 WL 1046010 (Surface Transp. Bd. May 13, 2002); 
Nat’l Classification Comm., Section 5a Application No. 61, 2001 WL 1470074 (Surface 
Transp. Bd. Nov. 20, 2001); EC–Mac Motor Carriers Serv. Ass’n, STB Section 5a 
Application No. 118, 2001 WL 1470067 (Surface Transp. Bd. Nov. 19, 2001); see also, 
e.g., Holland Am. Line Inc., STB Docket No. MC-F-21033, 2009 WL 891298 (Surface 
Transp. Bd. Apr. 3, 2009); Holland Am. Line Inc., STB Docket No. MC-F-21033 TA, 
2009 WL 730341 (Surface Transp. Bd. Mar. 20, 2009); Averitt Express, Inc., STB Docket 
No. MC-F-21023, 2008 WL 258338 (Surface Transp. Bd. Jan. 31, 2008) (pooling 
agreement); Motor Carrier Bureaus–Periodic Review Proceeding, STB Ex Parte No. 656, 
2007 WL 3121804 (Surface Transp. Bd. Oct. 25, 2007). 
82 EC–Mac Motor Carriers Serv. Ass’n, STB Section 5a Application No. 118, 2001 WL 
1470067 (Surface Transp. Bd. Nov. 19, 2001). 
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second bureau that operated largely to increase the rating (and 
consequent price) of various commodities when such changes were 
sought by trucking firms.  Initially, the STB sought to control the 
abuses of this system with an order requiring disclosure to all shippers 
of the existence of discounts along with some data on the range of 
such discounts.83  In 2001, the STB also imposed limits on the 
classification system, intending to increase access by shippers to the 
classification process, and it implemented an arbitration system for 
those who disputed a change in classification.84  However, in 2007, 
on the second review of the rate bureau system, the STB determined 
that it lacked any legitimate business justification.85  As a result, the 
STB withdrew prospectively its approval of all the bureaus governing 
trucking.86  This had the effect of eliminating the antitrust immunity 
that these organizations had enjoyed. 
Despite eliminating any antitrust immunity, the STB recognized 
that the bureaus served some useful functions.  These functions 
included producing mileage books to help trucking firms determine 
the length of hauls, the rules, and the through rates.87  The STB 
asserted that, by seeking review from the DOJ, the bureaus could 
obtain a business review clearance for activities of the bureaus that 
did not violate antitrust law.88  This assertion appears inconsistent, 
however, with the DOJ regulations governing such reviews, which 
require, inter alia, that the activity be a new one.  This part of the STB 
decision highlights the fact that some types of collaboration can 
enhance efficiency while raising antitrust concerns.  The question is 
whether the current system of review and clearance from the DOJ is a 
sufficient response. 
One might have expected that, after the STB terminated all 
trucking bureaus, it would end all grants of antitrust immunity.  But to 
 
83 Id.; EC–Mac Motor Carriers Serv. Ass’n, STB Section 5a Application No. 118, 2003 
WL 22357743 (Surface Transp. Bd. Mar. 21, 2003) (reaffirming the 2001 decision). 
84 Nat’l Classification Comm., Section 5a Application No. 61,2001 WL 1470074 
(Surface Transp. Bd. Nov. 20, 2001). 
85 Motor Carriers Bureaus–Periodic Review Proceeding, STB Ex Parte No. 656, 2007 
WL 2946673 (Surface Transp. Bd. May 7, 2007). 
86 The initial decision gave the bureaus ninety days before they lost their immunity.  Id. 
at 28. This was later extended until January 1, 2008.  Motor Carriers Bureaus–Periodic 
Review Proceeding, Section 5a Application No. 46, 2007 WL 1852195 (Surface Transp. 
Bd. June 28, 2007).  Interestingly, the bureaus did not appeal the decision to the courts, 
which suggests that its logic was truly compelling. 
87 Periodic Review Proceeding, supra note 85, at 25–27. 
88 Id. 
CARSTENSEN 4/1/2011  1:05 PM 
2011] Replacing Antitrust Exemptions for Transportation Industries 1085 
the contrary, in 2008, the STB conferred antitrust immunity on a 
proposed joint venture among a group of seven regional trucking 
companies to create an entity that provided a national service for 
small shipments.89  This required agreements regarding territory, 
customers, and prices.  As a result, the entity would have been 
susceptible to antitrust challenges from disgruntled participants, 
customers, competitors, or excluded would-be participants.  At the 
same time, this entity faces substantial competition from integrated 
national firms.  Hence, this venture, while likely to produce an 
efficient new competitor, is unlikely to reap major profits, even as it 
contributes to enhanced competition in this aspect of the market.  
Without some assurance that the risks of litigation would be minimal, 
the parties might well not have proceeded with this plan. 
Interestingly, the joint venture participants felt it necessary to go to 
the DOJ to get a business review clearance as well.90  Thus, an 
organization with antitrust immunity believed its immunity was 
sufficiently limited that it wanted the comfort of an antitrust review.  
There is a lack of congruence in this review system.  The STB 
immunity lasts five years and must be reviewed and reapproved 
before that time expires, but the DOJ clearance lasts indefinitely 
unless expressly revoked. 
Somewhat earlier, the STB had approved the revision of operating 
authority for a group of household goods movers who were working 
through a national entity to provide moving services for the 
Department of Defense.91  Here again, the proposal was essentially a 
joint venture that needed approval to satisfy statutory requirements, 
but of course, it also acquired antitrust immunity.  Thus, the most 
recent grants of immunity in trucking have involved legitimate joint 
ventures that would seem to raise only limited antitrust concerns, 
even though the risk levels might have deterred the parties from 
creating the venture absent some protection from antitrust litigation. 
Finally, the STB’s bus regulation involves two statutory schemes.  
First, the STB approved a rate bureau that set up standards for 
 
89 Averitt Express, Inc., STB Docket No. MC-F-21023, 2008 WL 258338 (Surface 
Transp. Bd. Jan. 31, 2008). 
90 Letter from Molly S. Boast, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
James R. Weiss (Sept. 8, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview 
/249806.htm.  Notably, it took nearly nine months after the STB had approved for the DOJ 
to make its decision. 
91 Atlas Van Lines, Inc., STB Docket No. MC-F-21010, 2005 WL 420418 (Surface 
Transp. Bd. Feb. 23, 2005). 
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interline transfers, basic prices, and terms for luggage and package 
shipments.  Second, under the intercity bus merger provision,92 the 
STB approves mergers and pooling agreements involving interstate 
business service. 
The STB treated the bus rate bureau in the same way as the 
trucking bureaus.  The STB initially allowed the bureau to continue.93  
The STB noted that the bureau had set standards and provided tariffs 
for only ancillary services but had not set prices for passenger service.  
Moreover, as had occurred in the trucking context, no bus company 
was required to follow these guidelines.  However, when the bus 
bureau returned to renew its immunity, the STB decided that the 
bureau no longer needed antitrust immunity.94  There were many 
other sources from which intercity bus companies could draw the 
necessary information to create tariffs and develop other components 
for their business.  The opinion also stressed that interline transfers 
would remain useful, but it required the actual parties to work out 
their specific agreement.95 
Most of the mergers and pooling decisions appear to involve 
relatively minor combinations that would probably not have any 
competitive implications.  The gain to the parties is that, once the 
STB has approved the merger, neither local nor national antitrust law 
will apply.  A few mergers involved the two or three national groups 
that are emerging as the dominant firms in this segment of the 
industry.  With respect to those acquisitions, there is nothing in the 
STB decisions that suggests any focus on the potential competitive 
issues that may arise, particularly if one were to assume that intercity 
bus service is a distinct product line.  Indeed, some of the assertions 
 
92 49 U.S.C. § 14303 (2006). 
93 Application of the National Bus Traffic Association, Inc., Section 5a Application No. 
9, 2002 WL 1046010 (Surface Transp. Bd. May 13, 2002). 
94 Periodic Review Proceeding, supra note 85, at 17–18. 
95 Intercity bus services are increasing with the emergence of a new generation of bus 
companies serving major cities with express bus connections.  There appear to be two 
major companies providing such service, largely in the eastern part of the country.  But, in 
addition, there are a number of smaller firms.  Because these bus lines use “curb” pick-up 
of passengers (i.e., they do not invest in expensive terminal facilities) and employ the 
internet for ticket sales, this market has emerged as one of unregulated, competitive 
growth.  See Susan Stellin, The Humble Bus Takes Off, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at TR3; 
Joseph P. Schwieterman et al., The Return of the Intercity Bus: The Decline and Recovery 
of Scheduled Service to American Cities, 1960–2007, (Dec. 24, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://las.depaul.edu/chaddick/docs/Docs/IntercityBusStudy.pdf. 
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in the opinions about low barriers to entry and substitute competition 
appear somewhat naive.96 
There were relatively few pooling decisions.  Such cases involve 
formal arrangements between two bus companies to combine service 
over a route and to coordinate their schedules.  In one case from New 
Jersey, an existing bus company had failed, and another company had 
proposed to take its place and operate in concert with the state-owned 
bus company serving the same route.97  This is a classic joint venture 
situation in which the loss of competition is arguably offset by better 
coordination among the venturers to serve the specific route.  The 
STB analysis focused on whether the resulting unified service would 
have significant market power.  Given the existence of other 
carriers—both commuter rail and bus—the STB concluded that there 
was little reason for concern. 
In sum, the STB’s position on protecting anticompetitive, 
cartelistic agreements changed in the course of the decade.  The result 
has been a much greater freeing up of the truck and bus industries to 
facilitate competition.  In the context of railroads, the STB has been 
unwilling to revisit its blanket acceptance of paper barriers (some of 
which are more than twenty years old), and that unwillingness 
reduces the potential for realizing the benefits of competition in rail 
freight service. 
3.  The Department of Transportation 
There are no reported decisions concerning the use of the airport 
congestion agreement statute.  The DOT appears to have addressed 
coordination of landing rights by other means.98  It has, however, 
granted a large number of petitions for antitrust immunity with 
respect to international “code sharing” and “alliances.”  Code sharing 
appears to be the process of creating a through ticket arrangement so 
that travelers can continue on a single ticket from their departure to 
their final destination.  Alliances appear to be more general 
 
96 See, e.g., Peter Pan Bus Lines Trust, STB Docket No. MC-F-20995, 2002 WL 
31876189 (Surface Transp. Bd. Dec. 27, 2002). 
97 New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc., STB Docket No. MC-F-20994, 2003 WL 
721657 (Surface Transp. Bd. Mar. 3, 2003). 
98 The DOT has the authority to impose limits on landing rights (slots) and has used this 
authority to control congestion at airports where such limits are required.  See, e.g., 49 
U.S.C. § 41714 (2006) (authorizing the secretary to reassign landing slots at congested 
airports to new entrants); 14 C.F.R. §§ 93.25–.32 (2010) (regulating the allocation of 
landing slots at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, a congested airport). 
CARSTENSEN 4/1/2011  1:05 PM 
1088 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 1059 
agreements among two or more airlines to coordinate services and 
flight schedules, including pooling of profits in some cases.  Both 
kinds of transactions are prima facie joint ventures.  An alliance 
involves more complete integration of the participants, while code 
sharing involves a much lower level of coordination.  Both kinds of 
ventures regularly receive the blessings of antitrust law, provided that 
the parties do not have excessive market power and that they have 
avoided unnecessary restraints on competition. 
The DOT records report fifty-seven code-sharing applications.99  
Of this fifty-seven, one matter involved all code-sharing international 
arrangements and established basic rules related to the responsibility 
of participants for luggage.100  Of the fifty-six actual code-sharing 
proposals, the DOT approved fifty-one, with three applications 
pending at the time we collected data. 
One application was withdrawn.101  This application sought 
approval for code sharing between United Airlines and Lufthansa for 
service to Bahrain and Kathmandu, based on United Airlines flights 
to Germany that connect with Lufthansa service to the final 
destinations.  This particular code-sharing proposal, which was 
withdrawn for undisclosed reasons, illustrates the potential reasons 
for seeking approval and protection from antitrust law.  The service 
may well be one of a limited number of services available to travelers.  
Hence, in a narrowly defined, point-to-point market, there may be a 
high market share.  This in turn may cause a disgruntled traveler, 
travel agent, or competitor to bring an antitrust action.  Even if the 
resulting code sharing were to result in significant cost savings on 
particular trips, it would be unlikely to generate very much overall 
revenue for the airlines.  Hence, the transaction cost risks that are 
inherent in such a venture may be sufficient to deter the parties when 
those risks are unprotected from antitrust exposure.  In fact, for 
whatever reasons, the parties did not pursue this code-sharing 
arrangement, and they ultimately withdrew the application. 
 
99 See, e.g., Joint Application of Gojet Airlines, LLC, Docket DOT-OST-2009-0131 
(Dep’t of Transp. May 27, 2009) (on file with author); Application of Eurowings 
Luftverkehrs AG, Docket DOT-OST-2009-0106 (Dep’t of Transp. May 5, 2009) (on file 
with author); see also, e.g., Master List DOT-Airline-Code Shares (on file with author). 
100 Application of Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG, Docket DOT-OST-2009-0106 (Dep’t of 
Transp. May 5, 2009) (on file with author). 
101 Joint Application of United Air Lines, Inc. and Deutsche Lufthansa, A.G., Docket 
OST 96-1717-1 (Dep’t of Transp. Sept. 18, 1996) (on file with author); 
Applications/Motions of Am. Airlines, Inc., Order 98-8-27 (Dep’t of Transp. Aug. 21, 
1998) (on file with author) (order dismissing applications). 
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Only one application was denied.102  The denial involved a 
proposal for international airmail service on a code-sharing basis that 
involved an American commuter airline and a foreign airline.  Major 
American airlines objected, and the DOT held that the applicant did 
not qualify for the code sharing because it did not, in fact, operate any 
large planes.  The fact that, out of fifty-seven proposals, the DOT 
turned down only one raises obvious questions about whether it is 
exercising appropriate oversight over these ventures.  Certainly the 
brief approval statements do not provide much evidence of careful 
review of the market contexts. 
With respect to alliances, the DOT received twenty-three 
applications (several were for the same basic group, either at different 
times or with somewhat different participation).103  It approved, 
sometimes with limitations, seventeen of these applications despite 
opposition from the Antitrust Division in some cases.  Two 
applications were expressly withdrawn.  In one case, the withdrawal 
came after the filing of critical comments that asserted that adverse, 
competitive effects were likely to result.104  In the other case, the 
DOT, in fact, rendered a preliminary decision rejecting the 
application on competitive grounds, but the parties then withdrew the 
alliance application.105  However, it also appears that the parties had 
received further approval for code sharing.  One proposal was 
 
102 Application of TIE Aviation, Inc., Order 2000-9-20, 2000 WL 1505123 (Dep’t of 
Transp. Sept. 20, 2000) (preliminary order); Application of TIE Aviation, Inc., Order 
2000-11-13, 2000 WL 34227552 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 17, 2000) (final order). 
103 See, e.g., Joint Application of Air Canada, Order 2009-4-5 (Dep’t of Transp. Apr. 7, 
2009) (on file with author) (show cause order); Joint Application of Am. Airlines, Inc., 
Order 2008-6-18, 2008 WL 5550452 (Dep’t of Transp. June 16, 2008) (order granting 
motion to dismiss); see also Master List: DOT-Airlines-Alliances (on file with author). 
104 See Joint Application of Am. Airlines, Inc., OST-00-7088-27 (Dep’t of Transp. May 
30, 2001) (on file with author) (providing negative comments by opposing parties); Joint 
Motion of Am. Airlines, Inc., OST-2000-7088-28 (Dep’t of Transp. Mar. 2, 2002) (on file 
with author) (withdrawing the application for alliance involving air travel between the 
United States and Central America). 
105 Joint Application of Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.p.A., Order 2005-12-12, at 3 
(Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 22, 2005) (on file with author) (order to show cause) (“Joint 
Applicants have not persuaded us that, absent the requested immunity, they would be 
unable to provide many of the benefits cited in their pleadings.  As the DOJ points out, the 
Joint Applicants have already engaged in a substantial amount of integration of their 
services to date, and are likely to integrate further without immunity, even though they 
may not coordinate their services and fares as much as they would with antitrust 
immunity.”); Joint Application of Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.p.A., Order 2006-2-1 
(Dep’t of Transp. Feb. 6, 2006) (on file with author) (final order) (proposing a 
combination of two competing alliances; the DOJ filed negative comments and the 
application was withdrawn). 
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formally pending.  In addition, three other applications were inactive 
so far as appears from the record.  However, the American Airlines-
British Airways alliance106 was subsequently approved in 2010 after 
the data set discussed here was completed.107 
The recent approval of the American Airlines-British Airways 
alliance provides an illustration of the tensions between competition 
policy and protective agency action.  The DOJ had criticized the 
proposal as creating undue market power in a number of city pairs.  
Several competing airlines emphasized the same point.  The DOJ was 
not, however, opposed to the venture itself.  The DOJ simply wanted 
the DOT to impose more restrictions on the venture than the DOT had 
imposed.  The decision authorizing and immunizing the alliance was 
in step with a comparable decision by the European Union’s 
competition commission.108  Basically, the partners were required to 
relinquish several landing slots at Heathrow Airport, a highly 
congested British Airways hub.  The real issues were twofold: (1) 
how many slots with what designations (i.e., specific city pairs or 
generally useable slots for flights from the United States to the United 
Kingdom) and (2) the nature of the divestiture (i.e., must the slots be 
permanently transferred, or could British Airways lease them for a 
period of years?).  On both issues, the DOJ wanted more slots and 
more durable rights than the DOT required.  Ultimately, the decision 
in this matter was resolved at the White House with the President 
giving the parties the benefit of the more generous (i.e., competitively 
risky) authority.  This case illustrates how the present system in air 
agreements weighs in favor of the interests of the parties and against a 
concern for preserving competition. 
 
106 Joint Application of Am. Airlines, Inc., OST-2001-10387-1 (Dep’t of Transp. Aug. 
10, 2001) (on file with author); Joint Application of Am. Airlines, Inc., OST-2001-10387-
162 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 25, 2001) (on file with author) (answer). 
107 See Joint Application of Am. Airlines, Inc., Order 2010-2-8 (Dep’t of Transp. Feb. 
13, 2010) (show cause order), available at http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2010/02 
/DOT-BA-AA-Approval.pdf. 
108 Notice published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in 
Case COMP/39.596 – British Airways/American Airlines/Iberia, 2010 O.J. (C 58), 7 (EC), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:058 
:FULL:EN:PDF. 
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B.  Summary of the Results 
1.  Support for the First Hypothesis: Cartel Activity 
This examination of several hundred decisions by the three 
transportation agencies reveals little explicit cartel activity.  
Moreover, the number of explicit cartel proposals declined over the 
period reviewed.  The STB and FMC faced the largest number of 
explicit cartel requests.  These requests reflected long-standing 
industry practice from the era of direct rate, route, and service 
regulation.  The generally negative response of the STB is telling.  
After initially looking for potential middle ground and deferring to 
Congress for several years, the STB has affirmatively eliminated 
antitrust immunity for the vestigial rate bureau cartels in both trucking 
and intercity bus service.  Basically, the STB rejected the long-run 
need for cartelistic policies for those industries.  Such policies are 
contrary to congressional policy. 
The FMC cases include explicit cartel arrangements that do not 
appear to serve any plausible public interest.  To be sure, those cartels 
were open to all comers and did not preclude participants from cutting 
prices if they operated outside the cartel or used individual shipper 
contracts.  The European Union’s rejection of antitrust immunity for 
similar price-fixing conferences of ocean carriers supports the 
conclusion that these agreements do not serve any legitimate public 
interest.  But unlike the STB, the FMC has yet to take an official 
position that old-style shipping conference agreements are no longer 
in the public interest.  But even if it did, without legislative change, 
there is little the FMC can do.  The statute requires the FMC to accept 
all filings in proper form, and the FMC can challenge only after the 
fact, with a significantly difficult burden of proof. 
The continued statutory acceptance of conference agreements on 
prices in combination with the apparently open-ended information 
sharing agreements probably have the effect of retarding competition 
in ocean freight service.  In particular, the conferences may facilitate 
broader understandings about prices and may have a more directly 
adverse impact on small shippers that are obliged to accept the posted 
prices and terms imposed by the conferences, rather than negotiating 
better terms.  These considerations were central to the decision of the 
STB to terminate all antitrust immunity for rate bureaus.  The 
empirical question of whether these effects actually occur merits more 
detailed examination than it has received.  Certainly, the investigation 
of the industry-wide run-up of rates in the face of declining 
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demand109 raises the question of whether the conference system is 
being used to facilitate or implement a global shipping cartel that 
would be outside the scope of authorized and immunized activity for 
any conference. 
It is also apparent that there are multiple and overlapping joint 
venture agreements being filed with the FMC for ocean shipping and 
approved by the DOT for international air service.  Without a 
complex grid to show exactly how the various major entities are 
interrelated, no clear conclusion can be drawn as to whether the web 
of agreements may serve as a means for coordinating competition and 
retarding the incentives to compete.  In theory, at least, all three 
agencies should be attentive to these risks.  Certainly, some of the 
STB and DOT decisions reflect explicit concerns for concentration 
and the risk of coordination among alternative service providers.  
There is no comparable record of concerns at the FMC, although a 
commissioner in 2009 asserted that the FMC did focus on the 
competitive implications of various proposed transactions.110 
2.  Support for the Second Hypothesis—First Alternative: Legitimate 
Joint Ventures 
In ocean shipping and air service, the dominant type of agreement 
is a joint venture of some kind that involves two or more firms 
collaborating together to provide a joint service.  The resulting 
agreement imposes restraints on the parties that could include market 
allocation, price setting, and express or implicit refusals to deal with 
competitors of the participants.  As such, these agreements contain a 
variety of horizontal restraints on competition.  But those restraints 
are prima facie ancillary to the collective enterprise.  Indeed, as 
discussed in the context of the DOT and STB opinions, these agencies 
give some attention to the scope and justification of the resulting 
restraints in an effort to ensure that they are reasonably consistent 
with and no more restrictive than necessary to accomplish the primary 
legitimate goal of facilitating the underlying transaction.111 
 
109 See Miller, supra note 13. 
110 Rebecca Dye, Fed. Mar. Comm’r, Address at the Global Liner Shipping Conference 
(Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.fmc.gov/news/default.aspx?CategoryId=3 
&Archive=y&ArticleId=996. 
111 The FMC’s actions, which consist of stamping applications with the date of 
acceptance, have no comparable competitive effect analysis, but a commissioner has 
asserted that the agency does consider that issue.  Id.  Moreover, in March 2010, the FMC 
initiated a proceeding to review the upward surge in ocean shipping prices.  See Vessel 
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The current bulk of the STB immunity decisions involve mergers 
in the bus and rail markets.112  In those contexts, the STB policies 
include a concern for competitive effects of the mergers.  Nothing in 
these recent decisions suggests that the results would be different if 
the DOJ had reviewed the proposed combinations, which is unlike the 
situation prior to 2000 when the DOJ vigorously but unsuccessfully 
opposed the merger of major western railroads.  Again, as noted, in 
the case of intercity bus mergers, there is a pattern of dominant firm 
acquisitions.  The overall potential for an anticompetitive impact is 
not evident, and in any event, it would require a theory of why this 
form of travel is a unique market with significant barriers to entry.  
For present purposes, however, what is central is that, in both the bus 
and rail contexts, the STB is reviewing mergers that facially involve 
standard aspects of industry consolidation to achieve efficiency 
through increased scope and range of service.  Thus, there seems no 
particular reason to insulate these transactions from standard antitrust 
review. 
Two factors may weigh in favor of some constraints on a standard 
antitrust merger review.  First, in some cases, the combination 
arguably may serve a public interest that outweighs the 
anticompetitive effects.  Such an argument would be more credible if 
the STB had authority to review and control prices and service.  Still, 
as in the case of bank mergers in which serving the “convenience and 
needs of the community” can trump an anticipated substantial 
anticompetitive effect, such cases may be hypothetically possible.113  
The banking cases teach, however, that the first test for any such 
claim is whether the merger is a necessary step in achieving the public 
interest goal.114  If there is some way other than an anticompetitive 
merger to serve that identified goal, then there is no basis for the 
defense.  In reviewing the STB’s rail and bus merger decisions, there 
is no clear evidence of any public interest served by the merger.  In 
any event, the point is moot as to these mergers because none of them 
seem to raise any significant competitive concerns. 
 
Capacity and Equipment Availability in the United States Export and Import Liner Trade, 
Fact Finding Investigation No. 26 (Fed. Mar. Comm’n Mar. 17, 2010) (order of 
investigation), available at http://www.fmc.gov/userfiles/pages/file/FactfindingOrder26 
.pdf. 
112 Once again demonstrating the inconsistency of the current regulatory system, the 
STB has no jurisdiction over mergers among trucking companies despite its authority to 
authorize their participation in cartels. 
113 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2006). 
114 See United States v. Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171 (1968). 
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In addition, there is a substantial procedural advantage to the 
present system from the perspective of the parties.  The parties face 
only a single decision maker with respect to the merger.  The 
statutory scheme gives exclusive authority to the STB and thus 
precludes both state intervention and direct challenges by national 
antitrust law enforcers.  In contrast, mergers in electricity and natural 
gas must run the gauntlet of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), or the 
DOJ, depending on the industry, as well as each state regulatory 
agency.115  Thus, STB approval creates a legal barrier to any 
simultaneous or subsequent challenge to the combination.  Again, the 
contrast with the bank merger process is interesting.  There, prior 
agency approval is necessary, but the DOJ then has thirty days to 
challenge the merger.116  If there is no challenge in that period, then 
there is repose, and the merger cannot be challenged in the future 
except on monopoly grounds. 
The STB has also used its authority to give immunity to joint 
ventures in the trucking and intercity bus industries.  Notably, in one 
of the trucking cases, this immunity did not fully protect the venture 
from antitrust liability in the eyes of its organizers because the 
organizers also sought business review clearance from the DOJ.  This 
illustrates the problem with the present system of immunity; the 
system may not provide sufficient insulation for legitimate 
transactions that the agency favors. 
The overall picture of approvals and filings suggests, however, that 
many of these ventures may include unnecessary, excessive restraints 
or may result in unnecessary concentration of control over 
transportation services in specific markets.  Perhaps the most 
conspicuous failure is the STB’s failure to undertake any effort to 
control the use of paper barriers, which defeats the most fundamental 
goals of rail deregulation.  This is all the more striking given the same 
agency’s recognition of the competitive harms resulting from rate 
bureaus.  The airline cases also reflect a “pro-industry” bias, 
evidenced by the consistent pattern of approvals with only minimal 
constraints.  Thus, a core problem with the transformed transportation 
industries is that the goal of workable competition is being frustrated, 
 
115 See Richard Pierce, Mergers in the Electric Power Industry, in COMPETITION 
POLICY AND MERGER ANALYSIS IN DEREGULATED AND NEWLY COMPETITIVE 
INDUSTRIES (Peter C. Carstensen & Susan Beth Farmer eds., 2008). 
116 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6).  See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, BANK 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS HANDBOOK (2007). 
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in part at least, by agency laxness in accepting too many pervasive 
joint enterprises. 
3.  Support for the Second Hypothesis—Second Alternative: Standard 
Setting 
All three agencies have accepted or approved and conferred 
antitrust immunity on certain agreements that have the goal of 
regulating competition only by imposing standards of various kinds 
on the services that transportation companies provide.  Based on the 
decisions reviewed to prepare this Article, this is clearer in the cases 
of the DOT and the FMC than in the case of the STB, which 
expressly changed its position on the need for such immunity in the 
truck and intercity bus industries.  However, the STB has recognized 
that it can order the use of standard forms, for example.  Such 
standards would be a substitute for the industry self-regulation that is 
provided by the rate bureaus.  Indeed, the bureau regulations were 
subject to direct review by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) and then the STB applying (nominally at least) a public interest 
standard.  Standard-setting situations are ones with which antitrust 
law has traditionally been least comfortable, as such agreements are 
hard to differentiate from naked restraints on competition of a purely 
cartelistic character.  Indeed, many cartels included standards as an 
important component of their restraints.117  However, the SSODA118 
gives a template for an acceptable standard-setting organization and 
provides some protections against treble-damage liability for the 
organization, and by implication, it requires any challenge to satisfy 
some kind of a rule of reason.  The existence of a route through 
antitrust law for standard setting and the potential for agency-
mandated standards combine to eliminate the need for antitrust 
immunity. 
4.  Some Tentative Conclusions 
The great bulk of agreements and combinations that benefit from 
antitrust immunity have no absolute need for such an entitlement.  
Despite the concerns about the specifics of a few ventures, a majority 
 
117 Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) 
(prohibiting restraints on dress marketing standards); United States v. Trenton Potteries 
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (prohibiting restraints on bathroom fixture standards). 
118 See Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4301–
4305 (2006)). 
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of the joint venture agreements seem to present little risk of any 
antitrust liability.  The relatively few standard-setting agreements are 
somewhat more problematic because they reflect a collective 
agreement among competitors that restricts the ways they compete.  
Because these agreements are subject to agency review and approval, 
the agreements could easily be transformed into formal agency orders 
based on an administrative proceeding in which all interested parties 
could participate as the STB has suggested.  Thus, even if such 
agreements were characterized as unlawful under antitrust law, they 
can easily be converted into a formal regulatory requirement.  With 
few exceptions, the current body of exempted agreements is not 
consistent with a clear cartel motivation. 
Two more troubling observations point toward the need for reform.  
First, especially in ocean shipping, some explicit cartel agreements 
remain.  There seems, however, to be little justification for such 
agreements.  Indeed, as the STB has stated in connection with the 
trucking agreements, such agreements are now contrary to declared 
public policy.  Second, the present systems for land and air 
transportation immunities fail to provide a sufficiently rigorous check 
on the potentially adverse competitive effects that can and do flow 
from unnecessarily restrictive or unduly inclusive ventures.  Worse, 
the FMC lacks any authority even to review the merits of submitted 
agreements that result in immunity.  Overall, then, the present system 
has a strong tendency to undermine competition.  The results are 
diminished efficiency and a loss of dynamic innovation.  Moreover, 
given the changes in the underlying market contexts that result from 
both technological and legal changes, there is no continuing policy 
reason for the current system of an agency’s unilateral grant of 
immunity. 
This is not to argue that the agencies serve no function.  First, the 
agencies provide a forum for establishing rules and regulations to 
govern aspects of these markets that are beyond the capacity of 
antitrust law and courts’ enforcing that law.  Second, the agencies 
establish important reporting requirements to obtain information 
necessary in evaluating the services being offered by transportation 
providers.  Third, the agencies provide continuing oversight, 
monitoring, and investigative capacity beyond the authorization or 
institutional capacity of the DOJ.  Thus, the question is not whether 
the agencies should be removed from the process but whether agency 
approval alone should warrant immunity from antitrust law. 
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IV 
CURRENT EXEMPTIONS DO NOT PROVIDE GOOD COVERAGE FOR 
IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS 
The current exemption process is one-sided—either the agency 
alone has sole decision-making power, or in the case of ocean 
shipping, the parties have the power.  Yet the vast majority of 
agreements are traditionally of the sort that antitrust law reviews and 
evaluates.  Hence, there are particular dangers of overreaching and 
weak analysis that arise from the de facto delegation of antitrust-type 
analysis to agencies or parties that do not possess significant expertise 
in the area.  The Antitrust Division of the DOJ has participated in 
some of the agency proceedings.  Most notably, the Antitrust Division 
has challenged some airline alliance agreements as well as some 
railroad mergers in the period prior to the agency decisions analyzed 
above. 
The current situation results in several kinds of mismatches.  First, 
the current DOJ business review process is for only new proposals, 
and a clearance lasts for the indefinite future. Second, various 
agencies’ approvals involve different time lines.  The STB can give 
five-year immunity periods but must review any immunized 
agreement after this period to reauthorize it.  The DOT follows the 
same pattern for its approval of code sharing and alliances.  While 
there is no time limit on FMC agreements, the agreements are subject 
to challenge if the agency has the resources and evidence to do that.  
Third, the immunity may not align with the full scope of the venture 
that requires review and approval.  (The trucking joint venture 
illustrates this.)  On the other hand, the STB has refused to provide 
any review of the merits of continuing bureau activities, and instead, 
it has remanded them to the DOJ review process.  The problem with 
remanding is that the DOJ clearance will be permanent and will not 
involve a periodic reconsideration of the merits of the conduct or the 
effect on the market. 
Substantively, the regulatory agencies bring greater expertise on 
the needs and interests of the industries that they oversee, but they do 
not bring the same level of expertise on the analysis of competitive 
issues.  The DOJ and the FTC, on the other hand, have greater 
expertise in analyzing competition issues, but these agencies may lack 
a detailed understanding of the industry as well as the ongoing ability 
to monitor the results of the conduct. 
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If a non-expert agency or private party submission can grant 
immunity from antitrust, this creates a significant risk of opportunistic 
conduct by the parties to the agreement.  The parties have no 
incentive to look for the least restrictive means to accomplish their 
legitimate goals.  One illustration was the now defunct rate bureau 
system for trucking and intercity bus service.  Both systems set high 
benchmark prices that failed to perform the potentially useful function 
of providing customers with relevant price and service information.  
Instead, the system produced a set of high “rack” prices that allowed 
the participants to exploit those customers who lacked the capacity to 
bargain effectively.  The unsuccessful efforts of the STB to find ways 
to induce better conduct by the rate bureaus to fulfill the legitimate 
informational functions of the tariff system illustrate the nature of the 
problem.  At the same time, it seems likely that, in some standard-
setting, joint operating, alliance, or pooling arrangements, there will 
be a need for critical and well-informed competitive effects analysis 
to ensure that the agreement is no more restrictive than necessary. 
The implication of the analysis of the actual submissions and the 
institutional context demonstrates that some other, better system 
should exist to provide whatever insulation from the transactional, 
venture-related risks may be desirable for collaboration efforts within 
the transportation industry. 
V 
THE PATH TO A ROBUST BUSINESS CLEARANCE SYSTEM 
A.  Sources for Suggestions 
Although the current antitrust business review process provides a 
permanent clearance, there are examples of exemptions with limited 
duration that require periodical review and re-approval.  The STB can 
give only a five-year immunity to trucking agreements.  Similarly, the 
secretary of transportation provides only five-year exemptions, after 
which the parties must return for a renewal.  Periodic review allows 
reconsideration of the need for particular restraints and allows third 
parties to have an opportunity to comment on and even challenge the 
continuation of the restraints in any agreement. 
One of the most interesting examples of an immunity statute is in 
the Small Business Administration Act, which provides that joint 
ventures for research and development can have an antitrust 
exemption, provided that the Attorney General and the administrator 
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of the SBA both approve.119  The exemption is terminable if the 
Attorney General withdraws consent, but the conduct of the venture 
up to that point remains immune from antitrust liability. 
Another equally important example is the Export Trading 
Company Act of 1982.120  Under this legislation, joint ventures 
involving American businesses can get an exemption from antitrust 
law if the businesses convince the Department of Commerce and the 
DOJ that their plan would not violate antitrust law!121  As in the case 
of transportation industries, joint ventures with modest profit 
expectations in the best of circumstances may well rationally want to 
have the assurance that they will not have to bear the post-transaction 
costs associated with (successfully) defending an antitrust case. 
B.  The Proposal 
First, all current antitrust exemptions for the transportation 
industries would be repealed.  Second, transportation entities engaged 
in joint ventures or other legitimate transactions (e.g., standard-setting 
agreements that are lawful under SSODA) should continue to file 
notices of their proposed ventures, which would be subject to review 
and approval by the appropriate agency based on public interest 
criteria.  In the case of the FMC, this would result in an important 
expansion of its authority, which would likely deter some 
overreaching agreements. 
Third, parties concerned about potential antitrust liability could 
request a “Robust Business Review Clearance” from the relevant 
regulatory agency and the DOJ.  The process would start with review 
by the relevant regulatory agency and its recommendation on the 
merits of the proposal (i.e., whether it was a legitimate venture and 
whether it would serve the public interest in transportation services).  
After that, in consultation with the agency, the DOJ would review the 
likely competitive merits of the proposal and potentially seek 
 
119 15 U.S.C. § 638(d) (2006).  For a brief description, see ABA MONOGRAPH, supra 
note 1, at 46. 
120 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4020. 
121 A certificate will be granted only if, inter alia, the agreement will not result in “a 
substantial lessening of competition or restraint of trade,” id. § 4013(a), which results in 
antitrust immunity, id. § 4016(a) (“[No] criminal or civil action may be brought under the 
antitrust laws against a person to whom a certificate of review is issued . . . .”). 
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modifications.122  If, after that review, the venture or proposal were 
found not to create serious competitive risks, the DOJ would issue a 
revocable robust clearance for a period of five years.  During the 
period of the clearance, the parties would be immune from antitrust 
claims arising from conduct authorized by the clearance.  Moreover, 
the clearance would be renewable on application using the same two-
agency review process.  The DOJ could revoke its clearance for cause 
at any time, but conduct occurring only after such revocation could be 
the subject of a private or public antitrust claim.  Thus, those who 
object to a proposal could challenge it at its inception or could make a 
challenge at the DOJ after approval to get the venture stripped of its 
antitrust immunity.  This would allow forward-looking relief of an 
injunctive sort but would protect the participants from liability for any 
damages occurring during the period of such a robust clearance. 
The clearance would, therefore, provide a shield from antitrust 
claims during the period of the clearance.123  No court could impose 
antitrust liability either for damages or injunctive relief based on 
conduct occurring during that period.124  The primary forum in which 
a public record could be made would be at the agency that reviews the 
request and provides its recommendations to the DOJ.  Thus, all 
stakeholders would have notice of the proposal.  This is something 
that does not exist in the current clearance process, but the DOJ itself 
would not have to create its own notice and comment system. 
In general, if the relevant agency recommends against clearance, 
that should end the process of seeking immunity.  An agency could 
approve the venture but decide against a clearance if the competitive 
issues were problematic and the gains were minimal.  Then the parties 
would have to decide whether the potential gains justified whatever 
litigation risks exist.  If the agency recommends clearance, then the 
DOJ should review the proposal to determine whether it raises 
sufficient competitive concerns to deny a clearance.  A central reason 
for DOJ oversight, review, and approval is the concern that the 
agency may not scrutinize the proposed restraints as strictly as would 
 
122 This process is close to what the DOJ currently employs for dealing with clearance 
requests involving activities that also require agency approval.  See DOJ Antitrust Division 
Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(10) (2010). 
123 This means that, during the period of the clearance, the only remedy for a 
disaffected entity would be to provide evidence to the DOJ in order to convince it to 
revoke the clearance. 
124 Proof of an ongoing collusion to engage in unlawful conduct may rely in part on 
conduct during the clearance period, but it would be relevant only to support a claim for 
post-clearance liability. 
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the DOJ, which is focused on competition law and policy.  This 
system would avoid too much overlap.  Only those proposals that the 
agency approves and recommends for clearance—something that the 
parties themselves would have to request—would be subject to 
further review.  Because the request for a clearance would be part of 
the initial filing, the DOJ review could proceed simultaneously with 
the agency review. 
There remains the question of judicial review of the resulting 
clearance.  While great deference ought to be paid to a decision that 
combines the expertise of two appropriate agencies, risks of either 
undue restrictiveness or excessive toleration of restrictive conduct 
remain.  One plausible response is to insist that only the requesters of 
the clearance and parties who participated in the agency proceeding 
have standing to challenge a decision.  The standard of review should 
be specified as a substantial abuse of discretion. 
In sum, the concept is that temporary antitrust immunity would go 
with these robust clearances, but the clearance itself would be subject 
to regular review and reconsideration.  Moreover, the conduct being 
authorized would have to be consistent with the substantive 
commands of antitrust law.  Cartelistic conduct, except in the form of 
standard setting, would be inherently unacceptable.  Thus, this 
process would simultaneously prohibit certain continuing kinds of 
conduct in the transportation industries and provide a stronger 
protection against litigation for lawful agreements. 
The other component of this proposed immunity system is merger 
review.  Here, a modest change would be to give the DOJ thirty days 
following approval to commence a lawsuit challenging the merger.125  
The thirty-day period could be framed as a statute of limitations, so 
that, after its expiration, the merger could not itself be challenged, but 
a structural challenge based on monopolization may remain available.  
As with the Bank Merger Act, on which this model is predicated, the 
agency finding of a public interest justification for an anticompetitive 
merger would provide an affirmative defense for an otherwise 
unlawful merger.  But, again using the banking model, the defense 
would be viable only if the public interest gains are real and tangible, 
as well as achievable only by a merger having anticompetitive effect.  
This would result in a shared assessment of the competitive effects of 
 
125 This suggestion is based on the bank merger statute.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6) 
(2006).  Standing could be limited to the DOJ if there remains a valid concern that other 
potential litigants may behave too strategically and without regard to the competitive 
merits of the transaction. 
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the merger because anticompetitive effects are also relevant to the 
public interest standard.  But it would provide an independent forum 
for assessing the competitive merits of the merger and balancing those 
effects against the non-efficient public service justifications believed 
to excuse the competitive harms. 
VI 
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR 
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 
Two objections to this proposal merit some attention before 
discussing in somewhat greater detail some of its specific features.  
The first issue is whether such a special antitrust treatment is 
necessary for transportation.  The second issue is, if the arguments for 
a stronger form of clearance are persuasive in this context, why they 
should not apply generally. 
A.  Is a Robust Clearance System Necessary? 
The analysis of the actual agreements approved by the various 
transportation agencies provides some evidence that there is merit in 
having agency review of the substance of the agreement even if it 
does not confer antitrust immunity.  At the same time, the number and 
complexity of multiparty agreements among competitors in 
transportation suggests that the perceptions of litigation risks may be 
greater than in many other industries.126  As a result, without some 
way of gaining stronger assurance that the conduct will be protected, 
some parties may not participate in joint ventures that improve the 
efficiency and coordination of shipments, flights, or services.  
Because there are potentially useful gains from integration in both 
physical and transactional aspects, the transportation industries offer a 
context in which greater assurance may be particularly relevant to 
achieving innovation and efficiency.127 
 
126 See Greg P. Stefflre, Chief Exec., Rail Delivery Servs., Inc., Address to the 
American Modernization Commission (Oct. 18, 2006) (arguing against the current 
immunity for maritime agreements but describing the complex web interrelationships 
involved in intermodal shipping).  But telecommunications and Internet services may well 
involve an equally large number of interrelationships.  The difference in seeking antitrust 
immunity may reflect historic experience and industry culture as much as any fundamental 
economic-organizational realities. 
127 In advancing this perspective, I am strongly influenced by a number of 
conversations with lawyers practicing in these industries who share a common perspective 
that the fears of antitrust litigation, even if the client is reasonably confident of eventually 
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B.  Why Limit Transportation? 
Transportation is an area where the record of agency actions makes 
clear that immunity is largely being bestowed on legitimate joint 
ventures and some arguably lawful standard-setting organizations.  
Thus, transportation provides the easiest set of examples in which the 
old statutory scheme of immunity could be replaced by a new, 
elective system that confers a reasonable degree of certainty but is not 
the old-style cartel protection system.  If it works with transportation, 
it could be extended to other contexts where appropriate.  However, 
as the ABA Monograph’s list of exemptions makes clear, there is no 
consistent pattern to the industries or immunities that Congress has 
created.128  Hence, when the goal is protection of legitimate ventures, 
this is a better strategy.  But if the goal is to protect cartels or if there 
is no regulatory agency—as is an increasingly common feature of 
antitrust immunity regimes—then other strategies will have to be 
found to replace the old-fashioned system with one more appropriate 
to contemporary policy. 
VII 
REFINING THE CONCEPT OF A ROBUST BUSINESS REVIEW 
CLEARANCE SYSTEM 
A.  The Relative Role of the DOJ and Specialized Agencies 
The suggested system gives the DOJ the final call on the proposed 
conduct, subject, however, to judicial review.  The contrary position 
is also plausible.  The DOJ could express its views to the agency,129 
and the agency could factor those views into its decision, much as is 
done in airline code sharing and alliances currently.  In that context, 
there should be a presumption against immunity for any agreement to 
which the DOJ objects on competitive grounds.  The agency would 
then have the burden of defending its decision that the public interest 
justification outweighed the competitive risks.  In this formulation, 
the DOJ should have standing to challenge any order authorizing such 
 
prevailing, will cause clients not to pursue rational, efficiency-enhancing ventures.  See 
Dye, supra note 110. 
128 See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1. 
129 This is the way the process works in the Export Trading Companies Act.  15 U.S.C. 
§§ 4001–4020.  But there, the DOJ has veto power over any proposal.  In the bank merger 
process, DOJ advises the bank agencies only of its views on the competitive effects of 
proposed combinations, but it retains an independent authority to challenge the merger.  
See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6). 
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an agreement as an antitrust violation, much as it does in the case of 
bank mergers.  Framing the process for voiding an authorization 
could be more difficult.  Presumably, the DOJ would be the party to 
initiate such a challenge before the agency that had the initial decision 
authority (subject to judicial review). 
From the perspective of promoting competition, giving the agency 
dominance may be counterproductive.  The history of Civil 
Aeronautics Board, DOT, Federal Communications Commission, 
FERC, FMC, ICC, and STB decisions is that they have not taken very 
effective account of competitive issues, and worse, the courts have 
not been sufficiently strict in their review of these agencies’ decisions 
overall.  Hence, giving agencies dominance is likely to result in more 
sympathy for industry demands and less concern for competition and 
the overall interests of an efficient, dynamic economy. 
B.  The Possibility and Bases on Which a Clearance May Be Revoked 
If the review process is conducted fairly and thoughtfully, the risks 
of revocation of an antitrust clearance should be minor.  Challenges 
would occur only if there were significant, unanticipated changes to 
the industry or to the enterprises (e.g., significant changes in 
management and business strategy).  The fact that a more open and 
formal review would occur every five years would further reduce the 
incentives to undertake any sustained challenge in the interim, absent 
some unusual and compelling set of circumstances. 
However, in the event of a challenge, the process drawn from the 
SBA and international trade legislation and the analogous process 
used in the airport statute are informative.  After all, the result of 
revocation of the clearance is only that the conduct is now open to an 
antitrust attack to be determined by the courts.  Moreover, the 
challenge has to be forward-looking.  It has to assert that continuation 
of some aspect of the joint activity violates antitrust law.  The 
challenger in this context carries the burden of persuasion, though this 
burden is perhaps lightened by the agency’s revocation of the 
clearance. 
Given that the effect of revocation is only to open future conduct to 
antitrust risks, such decisions should remain discretionary with the 
DOJ and should not be subject to judicial review.  There is a counter 
argument for transparency of decision-making and procedural 
legitimacy that may assert that these decisions should be reviewable.  
If reviewed, the standard should be an abuse of discretion requirement 
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on the merits.  The greater concern would be judicial imposition of 
procedures that unduly delay and complicate the review of a 
challenge to the continuation of a clearance.  The determinative factor 
seems to be that the parties participating in the initial decision and its 
review every five years would have standing to seek review at those 
times.  Hence, it seems unnecessary to complicate the withdrawal of a 
clearance with a similar requirement given that the merits of the DOJ 
decision would be testable in any subsequent litigation about the 
validity of the agreement. 
C.  The Continuing Need for and Role of the Transportation 
Regulatory Agencies 
It is commonplace that the DOJ is not a regulatory agency.  The 
Supreme Court has issued two major decisions involving the interface 
between regulation and antitrust on this insight.130  The nature of 
transportation services, whether for cargo or passengers, requires 
some ongoing oversight to enforce various rules and regulations that 
are necessary for access and fairness.  The agencies are well 
positioned to provide this supervision and to collect necessary data.  
Market-facilitating regulation is, in fact, an important part of what 
makes for efficient and fair markets.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are 
prime examples of agencies whose fundamental missions are to 
facilitate the market process with appropriate rules and oversight, 
including active enforcement.  The three transportation agencies can 
and should provide a similar kind of essential public service with 
respect to rail, truck, bus, air, and ocean transportation. 
Having seen the similar issues that currently confront the three 
agencies, however, it might be worth considering whether they could 
be consolidated into a single transportation regulatory agency, 
independent of the DOT.  Such an agency might be less vulnerable to 
capture by the industries it regulates because of the diversity of 
economic interests these industries would have.  But whether 
operating as one or three, a clear need remains for the expertise and 
institutional capacity of the regulatory agencies. 
 
130 Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (holding that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission is best suited to regulate price-fixing and market 
allocation among securities traders dealing in new issues of securities); Verizon 
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (holding 
that, despite legislative protection of potential antitrust liability in telecommunications, the 
problems of access to monopoly networks is best left to the regulatory agencies). 
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CONCLUSION 
It is time to rethink the function and role of exemptions from 
antitrust in light of the changing world—legally and economically—
in which they operate.  My suggestion is that, on balance, a system, 
akin to the European Union’s limited-duration clearances for specific 
kinds of agreements would be the best way to balance the need for 
cooperation and the tenet of antitrust that competition is the 
fundamental policy of this country. 
 
